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Paul Schiff Berman*
As Dennis Patterson and Alexis Galán correctly summarize,1 my book, (MPCBM-FHBM
1MVSBMJTN"ø+VSJTQSVEFODFPG -BX#FZPOE#PSEFST,2 has two principal components.
First, I argue that legal pluralism is a useful descriptive framework for understand-
ing the interaction among the multiple legal and quasi-legal normative systems at play 
in our globally interconnected world. Legal pluralism is a useful lens partly because 
it gets us beyond the endless and rather fruitless debates about how to de"ne what 
counts as law and what does not. Instead, we can direct our gaze to ef"cacy: what 
do populations come to view as binding and what seeps into legal consciousness over 
time. In addition, if  we use legal pluralism as our framework, we are more likely to 
recognize the potential impact of  non-state normative assertions, from religious law 
to ethnic codes to industry standards to accreditation regimes, and so on. Thus, legal 
pluralism offers a richer and more complex picture than other models that tend to 
focus on sovereignty and formal law-making power.
Second, turning from the descriptive to the normative, I suggest that state and non-
state communities might consciously consider designing procedural mechanisms, 
institutions, and discursive practices that at least attempt to maximize the oppor-
tunity for plural voices to be heard. Doing so provides more ports of  entry for more 
alternative law-making communities. This “juris-generative” approach,3 I argue, can 
at least sometimes produce better substantive decisions, but in any event it is more 
likely to cause decision-makers to take a restrained view of  their own power, leading to 
greater tolerance, inclusion, and the development of  harmonious processes because 
even losing parties feel that their voices were heard and taken seriously.
* Manatt/Ahn Professor of  Law, The George Washington University Law School.
1 Denis Patterson & Alexis Galán, 5IF -JNJUT PG  /PSNBUJWF -FHBM 1MVSBMJTN, 11(3) Int’l J. Const. L. XXX 
(2013).
2 PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: A JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW BEYOND BORDERS (2012).
3 4FF Robert Cover, 'PSFXPSE/PNPTBOE/BSSBUJWF5IF4VQSFNF$PVSU5FSN, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11–15 
(1983).
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Patterson and Galán, in their thoughtful review of  the book, largely accept the 
"rst argument and reserve most of  their critique for the second. Accordingly, I  too 
will focus on the normative aspects of  the book, but before I do, I think it is import-
ant to pause for a moment and consider just how signi"cant it is that scholars such 
as Patterson and Galán now so easily accept the descriptive usefulness of  the legal 
pluralist framework. Indeed, Patterson and Galán appear to treat this argument as 
suf"ciently self-evident, or “commonplace”4 (to use their word) that it does not even 
merit much discussion. That is remarkable in and of  itself, and it represents a sea 
change from the status quo circa 2000 when I began pursuing these issues, joining 
with a handful of  scholars to push for the application of  legal pluralist insights to the 
international and transnational arena. Certainly, there were no mainstream interna-
tional law scholars in the United States at that time advocating legal pluralism as a 
descriptive framework. Even those who were sympathetic to the idea that less infor-
mal transnational legal processes were signi"cant shapers of  norms did not explicitly 
draw on legal pluralism. And the responses of  both international law triumphalists 
and nation-state sovereigntists to pluralist arguments were equally hostile, the former 
because pluralism was seen as contributing to “fragmentation” and the undermining 
of  hard-won victories for international legal regimes, and the latter because of  fear 
that pluralism would trench on the assumed prerogatives of  nation-states. Thus, the 
idea that legal pluralism could be accepted, without much debate, as “a convincing” 
way of  “describing the current state of  global affairs”5 is a major advance.
Turning now to the normative argument I make regarding legal pluralism, it is 
important to start with a clear understanding of  the claim I seek to advance. Crucially, 
I attempt to provide a middle ground between sovereigntist territorialism, on the one 
hand, and universalist harmonization, on the other. To my mind, both sovereigntist 
territorialism and universalist harmonization try to wipe out pluralism by insisting 
on one authoritative set of  governing substantive norms that will resolve a dispute. 
In the sovereigntist territorial model, one community’s substantive norms trump all 
others, usually based on the primacy of  a nation-state in a territorial location that 
is somehow (and sometimes arbitrarily) tied to a dispute. Thus, the norms of  other 
nation-states and the norms of  non-state actors—whether transnational, interna-
tional, or subnational—are often rejected or ignored entirely. In contrast, a univer-
salist harmonization strategy tries to dissolve normative difference by subsuming the 
multiple community norms at play into one over-arching set of  substantive rules or 
standards. But despite their differences, both approaches retreat from the idea that 
there are multiple norm-generating communities who should have their voices heard 
and perspectives considered.
Instead, the pluralist approach I advance advocates the development of  procedural 
mechanisms, institutional designs, and discursive practices that seek to articulate and 
maintain a balance between sovereigntist territorialism and universalist harmoni-
zation. As such, successful mechanisms, institutions, or practices will be those that 
4 4FF Patterson & Galán, TVQSB note 1, at [manuscript p. 1].
5 *E. at [manuscript at 17].
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simultaneously celebrate both local variation and international order, and recognize 
the importance of  preserving both multiple sites for contestation and an interlock-
ing system of  reciprocity and exchange. Of  course, as I  repeatedly acknowledge in 
the book, actually doing that in dif"cult cases is a Herculean and perhaps impossible 
task. Certainly, mutual agreement about contested normative issues is unlikely and 
possibly even undesirable. Thus, the challenge is simply to try for a more proceduralist 
pluralism, by developing ways of  seeking mutual accommodation while keeping at 
least some “play” in the joints so that diversity is respected as much as possible. Such 
play in the joints also allows for the juris-generative possibilities inherent in having 
multiple lawmaking communities and multiple norms. Always the focus is on trying 
to forge a shared social space for taming normative con#ict while respecting differ-
ence. The crucial point is that these pluralist practices seek to inculcate habits of  mind 
in decision-makers that will cause them to think in a restrained and deferential way 
about their own “jurispathic” power,6 at least to the extent possible.
Interestingly, the criticism I usually receive in expounding this normative approach 
is that my vision gives too much space to plural norms. Thus, sovereigntists tend to 
object to the idea that nation-states should ever take into account international, trans-
national, or non-state norms. Meanwhile, international law triumphalists chafe at the 
idea that international norms should ever be subordinated to local practices that may 
be less liberal or less rights-protecting. But both positions are principally concerned 
that my approach would result in too much fragmentation and too much deference to 
what are viewed as illegitimate norms.
In contrast, Patterson and Galán criticize the book from precisely the opposite per-
spective. They suggest that, at heart, my argument is simply liberalism in another 
guise, that my soft procedural pluralism is essentially conventional and not truly plu-
ralist enough to radically reshape the space provided to multiple normative communi-
ties. Accordingly, I am in some sense happy to welcome this new critique because it 
offers a response to those who claim that my position is too extreme and destabiliz-
ing. After all, a position cannot easily be simultaneously too radical and not radical 
enough. Thus, I am tempted to simply embrace the critique, allow for the fact that my 
procedural pluralism is more liberal than a full-on embrace of  pluralism would be, and 
end the discussion there.
This is especially true because my book is not, and does not attempt to be, a work 
of  political philosophy. Accordingly, for me very little turns on whether my vision of  
legal pluralism is or is not consonant with one or more of  the many variant strands of  
liberalism articulated by political theorists. Nevertheless, while there is clearly a liberal 
bias at its core, I don’t think it’s true that the pluralist vision I advocate is TPMFMZ liberal-
ism in disguise. So perhaps it will be helpful in this response to sketch out what I see as 
both the core of  liberalism in my book as well as the ways in which the proceduralist 
vision of  pluralism I advocate, while it is not necessarily incompatible with liberalism, 
at least shifts the emphasis to a set of  values that are not always fully captured in the 
design of  liberal procedures and institutions.
6 4FF Cover, TVQSB note 3, at 11–15.
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Patterson and Galán argue that my reading of  pluralism is “unmistakably liberal.”7 
Although they do not precisely de"ne what they mean by liberalism, I think my pro-
ceduralist version of  pluralism is liberal to the following extent: what I am seeking 
are procedures, institutions, and practices that bring multiple norm-generating com-
munities into greater dialogue with each other. To take an example from the book,8 
I believe that the mere fact that the European Court of  Human Rights (ECtHR) has a 
margin of  appreciation doctrine that requires some deference both to state constitu-
tional courts and to local variation will tend to cause the judges of  the ECtHR to con-
sider those local variations in articulating a right, even as the judges simultaneously 
push towards the acceptance of  a universalist human rights norm. Thus, the margin 
of  appreciation doctrine creates an iterative interactive process among communities 
that would not exist as strongly if  the Court simply tried to impose an international 
norm hierarchically on the one hand, or fully deferred to local norms on the other. 
Likewise, a hybrid court or tribunal with members of  multiple communities sitting 
next to each other will likely tend to create more dialogue among those communities 
in reaching an outcome. Or a choice of  law doctrine that requires decision-makers to 
look to norms other than those of  their own community as possible rules of  decision 
will result in more thoughtful consideration of  those alternative communities, regard-
less of  the ultimate outcome of  the case. In each of  these circumstances, the goal is 
to make decision-makers more restrained in their exercise of  jurispathic power and 
more accommodating of  difference. And of  course these same principles could be, and 
sometimes are, adopted by non-state communities in developing ways of  managing 
their interactions with others.
But it is obviously true that some communities don’t even want to join the dialogue. 
Or that some communities wish to exclude certain segments of  the population (e.g., 
women) from the conversation. Some might even question whether rational dialogue 
is what is needed to make decisions. For example, if  a religious leader seeks merely to 
impose an asserted universal truth by "at, there is little room for the conversation, 
deference, and accommodation that I hope a more pluralist mechanism will engender. 
Accordingly, my proceduralist vision of  pluralism contains a Habermasian bias favor-
ing inclusion, participation, and conversation, and some illiberal communities will 
reject it on that basis. On the #ip side, liberal jurisprudence might not always be able 
to accommodate some absolutist exclusionary views, thereby limiting the range of  
normative pluralism somewhat.
However, just because there is a core of  liberalism in the idea of  fostering dialogue 
across difference does not mean that the pluralist approach adds nothing. For exam-
ple, consider a governing council of  decision-makers popularly elected by citizens of  
a community. Assume that every council member happens to be a member of  the 
same majority ethnic, racial, or religious group within that broader community. If  
the election were conducted fairly and the governing body does not unduly infringe 
minority rights in its substantive decisions, then under most theories of  liberalism of  
7 Patterson & Galán, TVQSB note 1, at [manuscript p. 18].
8 4FF Berman, TVQSB note 2, at 161–163.
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which I am aware there is at least some justi"cation for saying that this is a legitimate 
arrangement. If  one embraces the vision of  legal pluralism I pursue, however, one 
might reach the conclusion that even if  this rule solely by members of  the dominant 
group is MFHJUJNBUF, it is likely not QSFGFSBCMF. This is because the procedural pluralist 
approach adds to the mix a preference for greater dialogue among multiple commu-
nities to improve the quality of  decision-making, to build habits of  mind that incul-
cate tolerance, and to make it more likely that the minority will acquiesce in whatever 
substantive decisions are ultimately reached. Accordingly, following a more plural-
ist approach, one might decide to set aside certain seats on the governing council for 
the minority group. Either of  these arrangements is likely compatible with liberalism; 
however, the pluralist perspective adds an additional set of  considerations to weigh in 
the institutional design decision. Of  course, there are liberal theorists who would simi-
larly seek structural accommodation to minority groups of  this sort, and as Patterson 
and Galán point out,9 Will Kymlicka is a prominent example. But I did not invoke 
Kymlicka in my book because I did not understand my project to be either defending 
or attacking any particular vision of  liberalism. Rather, my aim was simply to point to 
the prudential reasons that more pluralist mechanisms might be desirable.
Another example from the book10 concerns the US Supreme Court’s decision in 
&NQMPZNFOU%JW%FQUPG )VNBO3FTPVSDFTPG 0SFHPOWø4NJUI.11 Here, the Court ruled 
that a general state statute forbidding certain narcotics should be applied to a native 
tribal community’s religious practice that included the use of  peyote. I am concerned, 
however, less with the outcome of  the case than with the structures of  decision-making. 
If  the Court merely sees a hierarchy whereby federal law wins, that is a fundamentally 
jurispathic approach because it never considers alternative normative communities. 
Instead, I suggest that the question be viewed through a choice-of-law framework and 
that the Court should seriously consider whether it can defer to the tribal normative 
assertion without sacri"cing its own deeply held constitutive commitments. This is a 
fundamentally different approach I believe, again even if  both are consonant with the 
basic tenants of  liberalism. And again the actual outcome of  this inquiry is far less 
important to me than the framework of  engagement that is deployed.
Indeed, part of  the critique Patterson and Galán launch stems from the fact that they 
are seeking from my project something I explicitly state I am not offering: a prescrip-
tive determination of  how various substantive normative con#icts should be resolved 
in speci"c cases. Thus, they ask: “Does the acceptance of  communities entail the total 
elimination of  individual rights? Do communities bear rights and duties independently 
of  individuals?”12 And so on. These are dif"cult—and likely impossible—questions to 
resolve de"nitively in individual cases. But in any event, I do not believe that there is a 
position outside of  a particular culture and sociolegal system where one can stand and 
even try to provide a de"nitive answer to such questions. Accordingly, Patterson and 
9 4FF Patterson & Galán, TVQSB note 1, at [manuscript at 19–21].
10 4FF Berman, TVQSB note 2, at 290.
11 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
12 Patterson & Galán, TVQSB note 1, at XXX.
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Galán crucially misread the book when they offer a statement such as: “For him plural-
ism is acceptable so long as it does not breach certain minimum standards.”13 This is 
because, although I QFSTPOBMMZ may prefer regimes based on minimum individual rights 
standards, that is not something I am taking a stand on one way or the other. I sim-
ply note as a descriptive matter that embracing procedural mechanisms, institutional 
designs, and discursive practices that allow for plural voices needs not necessarily com-
mit one to a position that abandons individual rights. It only requires that the vari-
ous normative voices be DPOTJEFSFE, not that they necessarily win. And if  some of  those 
communities are suf"ciently illiberal, then a decision-maker committed to liberalism 
will reject the norms of  illiberal communities on that basis. My approach neither advo-
cates in favor or against such judgments. Different decision-makers will reach different 
conclusions under different factual scenarios, and I personally will agree with some 
decisions and disagree with others based on my own political, moral, and ethical com-
mitments. All I am advocating in my proceduralist vision of  legal pluralism is that we 
seek to inculcate habits of  mind that will tend to cause us to seriously consider multiple 
normative frameworks and communities before reaching whatever decisions we reach.
Next, Patterson and Galán contend that my embrace of  cosmopolitanism means 
that I necessarily privilege the individual over the community. This is because cosmo-
politanism arguably includes the idea that human beings can belong to a single over-
arching world community, and that this community should be cultivated. However, 
that is not quite the way in which I use the idea of  cosmopolitanism. I focus on cos-
mopolitanism not as a universalist belief  in world citizenship above all, but simply as a 
recognition of  multiple attachments from the most local to the most global (and many 
attachments not based on place at all). So, a cosmopolitan approach to jurisdiction, 
for example, would not necessarily defer to the idea of  a party as a world citizen over 
other possible community af"liations, but it would ask decision-makers to consider 
the range of  possible community af"liations that might be salient. There is probably 
nothing in this vision that is inconsistent with liberalism, but I think that is not the 
same thing as saying that nothing has been added.
Finally, we come to what is perhaps the crux of  the matter. Patterson and Galán point 
out that the sorts of  procedural mechanisms, institutional designs, and discursive prac-
tices I advocate require “a larger normative environment in which pluralism has to be 
negotiated.”14 This is true, and as noted above that normative environment is one in 
which reasoned discourse among multiple worldviews is both accommodated and fos-
tered as much as possible. Accordingly, there must at least be agreement among the dif-
ferent normative communities to participate in the common enterprise. If  they refuse 
to participate then there is little that can be done within the legal arena, it seems to me.
In the book,15 I draw on theorist Chantal Mouffe’s distinction between “adversaries” 
and “enemies.”16 Adversaries are willing to enter the same social space and contest 
13 *E. at XXX.
14 *E. at [manuscript at 26].
15 4FF Berman, TVQSB note 2, at 145–146.
16 CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX 13 (2000).
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substantive normative disagreements; enemies are unwilling even to engage. The goal 
of  my procedural pluralism is to encourage as many normative communities as possible 
to be adversaries rather than enemies. I argue that a system that routinely squelches 
alternative voices is likely to create more enemies over time, whereas one that seeks to 
allow multiple voices to be heard and tries for accommodation as much as possible will 
be more successful at turning at least some of  those enemies into adversaries. Again, 
if  this simply means bringing more enemies into the ambit of  a liberal legal order that 
seeks maximum accommodation and deference to plural norms from plural communi-
ties, then I am happy to embrace that form of  pluralism (and that form of  liberalism).
But Patterson and Galán want legal pluralism to be something far more radical (and 
far more impractical). So, for example, in the book I make what I think is a relatively 
moderate and restrained argument that liberal communities might try to open limited 
space for sharia courts to operate so long as those courts do not trench upon fun-
damental values of  the liberal community.17 And it should be noted that even that 
moderate and restrained version of  the argument draws "re from critics across the 
political spectrum, from rights advocates worried about illiberal practices to nation-
state sovereigntists worried about giving any authority at all to non-state communi-
ties. Patterson and Galán, in contrast, want to push much farther. They claim that 
it’s not really pluralism unless I go all the way and advocate that liberal communities 
allow sharia courts to operate SFHBSEMFTT of  whether or not they violate fundamental 
values of  the liberal community. This strikes me as absurd. Just because one embraces 
insights from legal pluralism, after all, does not mean that the values of  pluralism 
must necessarily and always trump any other values a community might hold. It sim-
ply cannot be that legal pluralism is only a true normative position if  it is pursued to 
the exclusion of  all other values, interests, and commitments.
Patterson and Galán treat my balancing of  the values of  pluralism with other 
values as ambivalence. They correctly note that my book celebrates pluralism as a 
descriptive fact, that I appreciate the existence of  multiple overlapping communities, 
and that I resist universalizing tendencies that reduce diversity. But they see all that as 
inconsistent with my effort to encourage the creation of  legal mechanisms to manage 
this pluralism. However, these positions are not inconsistent at all. Indeed, they are 
likely to be our only hope of  addressing the reality of  pluralism without either squelch-
ing all alternative views on the one hand, or having no legal order at all, on the other.
I acknowledge that striking this balance is extraordinarily dif"cult and perhaps 
impossible to achieve fully. But that does not mean it is incoherent or analytically 
inconsistent to try. And most importantly my book simply argues that it is norma-
tively desirable for communities to make the effort. Indeed, as noted above, I am far 
less concerned with how individual cases are decided or how individual institutions 
or mechanisms are designed than I am in trying to ensure that whoever reaches those 
decisions considers the values of  legal pluralism as part of  the calculus. So, yes, legal 
pluralism gets subsumed within a broader set of  values held by any given decision-
maker or community, but that does not mean that factoring in the values of  pluralism 
17 4FF Berman, TVQSB note 2, at 225.
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does not create long-term changes in the way the decision-maker or community tack-
les procedural or institutional design challenges.
Because my approach is not fundamentally concerned with prescribing outcomes in 
speci"c cases, when I do provide examples of  how such cases might be tackled within a 
framework that takes pluralism seriously, I do so for illustrative purposes only, not to pro-
vide de"nitive right answers. Indeed, part of  the pluralist insight is that any answer pro-
vided by a decision-maker is inevitably partial and subject to contestation, resistance, and 
revision over time. Thus, Patterson and Galán miss the point when they complain that 
my particular suggestions about these illustrative cases seem arbitrary and do not provide 
de"nitive guidance to decision-makers. Indeed, it would be hubris for me to provide pre-
scriptive rules of  decision (and very un-pluralist at that!). Instead, I merely suggest that 
decision-makers might take the insights of  legal pluralism into account and that doing so 
could change jurisprudential outcomes or institutional designs in some instances.
Whether this results in a system that is too open-ended and unpredictable is a mat-
ter of  personal opinion. Certainly, the system of  federalism that the United States has 
negotiated since its founding makes life and law far more unpredictable and contested 
than if  we had a single government based in Washington, DC. Yet, we live with the 
uncertainty and constant tension created by a system of  51 different sovereign enti-
ties because the values of  legal pluralism trump certainty and predictability, at least to 
some degree. Where one places the divide between pluralism and certainty is an indi-
vidual judgment and is beyond the scope of  my book. Again, all I advocate is for people 
to embrace the independent values of  pluralism and provide as much scope for those 
values as they can, recognizing that what they think they can accommodate will vary 
from person to person, context to context, community to community.
If  this more measured and contextualized approach fails to meet the criteria for the 
philosophically pure vision of  legal pluralism Patterson and Galán want me to advo-
cate, then so be it. Perhaps my vision of  legal pluralism is itself  pluralist: it recognizes 
that the values of  pluralism—accommodating multiple voices, recognizing multiple 
community af"liations, considering multiple norms—are themselves only one set of  
values among many. And so, as with any other values, the values of  legal pluralism 
should not always win. The essence of  law is that it strikes balances among competing 
visions. All my book seeks to suggest is that the descriptive reality and normative ben-
e"ts of  accommodating legal pluralism should always be part of  that balance, not that 
they should necessarily prevail in all circumstances. Moreover, communities that keep 
legal pluralism in their calculus when reaching decisions and designing institutions 
will tend to reach different decisions and design different kinds of  institutions at least 
some of  the time. These decisions and institutions will tend to be more tolerant of  mul-
tiple worldviews and more restrained in the imposition of  their own power. They will 
build more play in the joints so that different voices can be heard and considered. And 
they will have a better chance of  turning enemies into adversaries. That is a vision 
I think deserves consideration, regardless of  whether it counts in abstract terms as an 
independent philosophical position or not.
